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China’s Image from the Perspective of the Developmental State: 
What Kind of “Developmental State” is China? 

Yang Hutao1 
Abstract: The developmental state has become a popular definition used to discuss the “China 
Model”. Based on the developmental state, various definitions have originated. Concepts such as 
new developmental states and neo-developmentalism are widely applied to describe Chinese 
development. This paper summarizes representative opinions in examining China from the 
perspective of the developmental state, and reevaluates the specificity and characteristics of the 
Chinese developmental state in terms of structural dynamism. We believe that the developmental 
state as a concept is not precisely defined. Instead, its application and extension must incorporate 
considerations of historical specificity and subject continuity. Considering such initial constraints 
as politics, economics, and military conditions, China differs significantly from other classic 
examples of East Asian developmental states. Consequently, China would also face different 
developmental paths, directions, corresponding policies, and measures from those of other 
developmental states. The East Asian experiences of developmental states only offer limited scope 
for reference. Still, in terms of effective integration between markets, governments, and societies, 
their experiences and lessons prove worthy for consideration and reflection. 
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Introduction 
In research on models of economic development for China, the theory of the developmental state 
has often become the most convenient label. Regardless of consideration for historical, 
geographical, or cultural backgrounds, researchers have found it difficult for them not to correlate 
China’s development with those of its East Asian neighboring countries. Consensus among 
researchers states that the growth trajectories of China and its East Asian neighbors shares such 
similarities as high savings rates, high investment rates, and government leadership. Also 
acknowledged are characteristics unique to China. For instance, the Chinese official promotion 
mechanism inspires competition among local governments. China focuses more on the direct state 
ownership of large-scale enterprises and emphasizes the competitive power of national teams 

1 Yang Hutao has a PhD in Economics and is Professor at the School of Economics at Zhongnan 
University of Economics and Law. E-mail: 86288256@qq.com 
Yang Hutao JCIR: VOL. 6, No. 1 (2018) 
96 
(Albert, 2014). Through a process of comparative studies, derivative concepts of developmental 
states emerged. These include the New Developmental State (NDS) (Trubek, 2010), the Listian 
Developmental State (Breslin, 2011), and Post-Listian theory (Strange, 2011). 
It is more likely that the application of the developmental state concept to China, either 
directly or correctively, originated from a certain inertia of technical jargon. Still, it would be 
cursory to apply the same logic and assume theories and policies for developmental states would 
be completely applicable for explaining or even guiding China. Since its coinage, the concept of 
the developmental state is not a theory of “one size fits all”. Rather, it is merely a theoretical 
framework with historical specificity. No two identical developmental states exist in the world in 
terms of policies, processes, or performance. Therefore, although various concepts of 
developmental states applied to China take into consideration China’s initial conditions and 
differing external environments, it is still necessary to prudently analyze the rationality and 
enlightenment of those concepts. For instance, do key similarities suffice to make China and East 
Asian countries share concepts of the developmental state, or vice versa? Do the discrepancies 
between China and other developmental states suggest other root causes of existing problems in 
Chinese economic development than ones from other East Asian countries? Do those discrepancies 
mean China may choose a different path for development? This paper aims to clarify the 
connotations of the developmental state and its derivative concepts and explore their significance 
for enlightenment.    
Developmental State Theory: A Habitual Classification Tag 
The Beijing Consensus was first raised by Kavaljit Singh in 2002 (Kavaljit, 2002) and was further 
publicized in 2004 by American scholar Joshua Cooper Ramo through his article The Beijing 
Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power, which kick started hot waves of 
discussion on the China Model and “China’s Rise” in academic circles at home and abroad. Such 
discussions reached a climax after the economic crisis in 2008. In 2009 alone, the number of papers 
discussing the China Model totaled 3,000 (Fewsmith, 2011). As Breslin (2011) puts it, researchers 
from either China or other countries all showed their strong interest in the China Model during and 
after the economic crisis. 
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After the Southeast Asian financial crisis of the 1990s, the developmental state theory was 
heavily criticized. Notably, its key hypothesis, stating that “an autonomic government exists 
independently under the pressure of the social group” was criticized for its over-idealization. Still, 
the developmental state remained a major perspective in many discussions around the China Model. 
A considerable number of scholars believe China is certainly a developmental state (Wang et. al, 
2011). Some scholars make amendments to the concepts of the developmental state. Concepts such 
as NDS, State Capitalism (Schweinberger, 2014), Liberal Neo-Developmentalism, New Listian- 
and Post-Listian theory were proposed to describe the China Model (Strange, 2011). In fact, the 
perspective of the developmental state is not limited to research on the China Model, since it is 
also applied to analyses of other emerging economies like Brazil and India (Haggard, 2013). 
Developmental state theory has maintained its vitality since its inception in the 1980s for more 
than 30 years, reinforcing the comments made by Peter Evans. To quote him,  
 
The idea of the “developmental state” has proved one of the most robust, charismatic 
concepts in development theory. Following the western-centered modernism theory of 
1950s and the dependency theory of 1960s, it is the most suitable theory to depict the 
economic development of emerging economies, especially so for East Asian countries 
(Evans, 2013). 
 
The developmental state theory originated from Chalmers Johnson’s research on the 
Japanese economic miracle (Johnson, 1982), and was further improved and developed after Alice 
H. Amsden’s research on South Korea in the post-World War II era (Amsden, 1989), and Robert 
Wade and Evans ’s research on Taiwan (Wade, 1990; Evans, 1995). Yu Zuoen provided an 
overview on the developmental state theory, characterizing developmental states as countries with 
sustained aspirations for development, highly-autonomous central economic bureaucratic 
institutions, close cooperation between government and businesses, and selective industrial polices 
(Yu, 2008). As far as organizational structures and operational features are concerned, 
developmental states are characterized by excellent bureaucrats, national independence, market 
intervention, and planning departments (Johnson, 1982). East Asian countries undertook the 
developmental state path that differs from liberalism and planned economy, achieving 
Gerschenkron’s ideal of concentrated and accelerated industrialization for catch-up economies. 
According to the developmental state theory, the historical and cultural specificity of East Asia 
translates into a high degree of autonomy, paving the way for elite technocrats to possess capacity 
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and willingness to intervene in the economy, sustaining economic development by providing 
industry-specific subsidies and various forms of support. 
 
In the formation process of the developmental state theory, representative figures like 
Johnson and Amsden have proposed different definitions for developmental states, based on their 
specific case studies. The subject countries all differ in policies and decision-making. This is 
further complicated when all pioneers of the developmental state theory stress their uniqueness 
and lack of reproducibility. When discussing the key to success, Johnson attributes Japanese 
success to the industrial plan of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the 
close relations between politics and commerce. Amsden believes that the reason for South Korean 
success lies in its governmental subsidies which distorted prices. In Wade’s opinions, the success 
of Taiwan comes from its guiding markets and triggering free markets. Although they all 
emphasize the state’s effective involvement in the economy, these approaches differ significantly 
in actual implementation. For instance, South Korea focuses on plutocrats, and Taiwan on medium 
and small-sized enterprises. Although all the East Asian developmental countries and regions 
stress that collectivism and a nationalist spirit play crucial roles in the process of building strong 
nations and economic supremacy, industrial policies and foreign investment policies still differ, 
with Singapore and Hong Kong more akin to internationalism, Japan displaying nationalist traits, 
and South Korea evidently showing statism (Zheng, 1996) . 
 
Therefore, many researchers believe that the developmental state is merely an abstract 
concept instead of a clear and operable one. Harvard University Professor John Knight points out 
the lack of consensus on what the developmental state really is, despite its apparent popularity as 
a concept (Knight, 2014). Other scholars believe that historical factors were excluded from 
consideration when researchers like Johnson studied the characteristics of the developmental state. 
When their successors expand on such ideal types, the historicity embedded in its embryonic 
definition is often neglected, rendering it an abstract theoretical model with no attachment to 
history. From a definition perspective, the developmental state is just the integration and extension 
of mercantilism, bureaucrat capitalism, corporatism, and state-centrism (Zheng, 1996). From a 
practical perspective, the developmental state differs considerably in policies, politics-commerce 
relations, and economic performance across different countries and regions. In addition to the 
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flaws known to all, such as ignoring the complexity of states and regarding bureaucrat groups as 
the only decision makers, the developmental state theory is “theoretical materialization” and “tends 
to be applied to categorize facts and becomes a label to categorize for rapidly developing countries” 
(Wu,2014). In this sense, the wide use of the developmental state, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, can be regarded as terminological inertia, rather than a precisely grasped concept. 
This is exactly why we have to consider with caution the labelling of China as developmental. 
 
Representative Views on China from the Perspective of the Developmental State 
Various research on China from the perspective of the developmental state can be classified as 
follows: some believe that, although differences between China and East Asian developmental 
states exist, such differences do not suffice to constitute a developmental state type unique to China. 
China today is comparable with Japan before the 1980s and South Korea after the 1990s. Scholars 
including Knight (2014), Kalinowski (2014), and Baek (2009) champion these beliefs. Others 
propose that significant differences between China and East Asian developmental states would 
mean that theories and policy recommendations for developmental states are no longer appropriate 
for China or other emerging economies. Representative scholars who hold this view include 
Trubek (2008) and Evans (2013, 2014).  
 
The differences between those two opinions mentioned above are: the former believes that 
the developmental state is regarded as an inevitable development phase with common features for 
a backward country to catch up with and surpass developed countries. Consequently, the 
developmental state in a specific time frame can always find comparable subjects in history. The 
latter believes the developmental state is a dynamic concept, and the developmental states at 
different development stages possess different features. Accordingly, the connotations of the 
concept of the developmental state need to be redefined with renewed meaning.  
 
John B. Knight is one of important representatives of the former opinion. For Knight, the 
concept of the developmental state has no consensus at a higher level. All states can be called 
developmental states as long as two conditions are met: firstly, the state regards economic 
development as its preferential target; and secondly, the state strives to achieve this target through 
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institutional arrangement and incentive structures2. Thus, according to Knight, the first thirty years 
in the history of China focused on political rather than economic development, and major 
achievements are reflected in the political field. It was only after 1979 that China began to orient 
towards economic development as its preferential target, thus becoming a developmental state. 
Just like many other scholars, he thinks that much development in China is driven by local 
governments’ competition guided by political decentralization, clearly featuring promotional 
competition. To a large extent, Chinese local governments conform to the definition of 
developmental states3. He concludes that China is a successful developmental state, and China still 
qualifies as a developmental state to this day. It confronts developmental barriers and risks such 
as interest groups, social stability, and financial risks, the same as those encountered by other East 
Asian developmental countries in their early development stages. China should take care about the 
predicaments and risks that East Asian countries face.    
 
Similar opinions are also held by Korean scholar Baek (2005), Beeson (2010), Kalinowski 
(2014), and so on. Baek Seung-Wook compares governmental controls over financial resources 
and export-oriented industrial policies, deriving the conclusion that no substantial difference 
between China and other East Asian development countries exists, and is extremely like Taiwan. 
Mark Beeson believes the Chinese and Japanese economic modes share many similarities and can 
share the label of developmental state. The most fundamental similarity is that, in China and Japan, 
strong national intervention receives much less criticism than it would in the UK and the USA. 
Still, Beeson admits that certain problems and characteristics in Chinese institutions are different 

2 Knight does not believe that a developmental state means a high growth rate. In his opinion, 
whether a state is a developmental state or not cannot be judged from its performance, because it 
is possible for a state to set economic development as its priority, but this target may fail to be 
reached due to restricted conditions or ineffective policies. Likewise, a state may achieve a higher 
growth rate due to accidental factors like good initial conditions and good market opportunities, 
even if the state does not devise effective institutional arrangements. So, a developmental state 
does not necessitate rapid economic development, and a state with rapid economic development 
may not be a developmental state. 
3 Richard Stubbs (2009) also holds such ideas: that Chinese local government fits better with the 
characteristics of the developmental state.  
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from those of Japan, especially China’s insufficiency in national power and strong dependence on 
foreign investment. Generally, China is still like Japan, in that, 
 
to employ a comprehensive path of technological upgrading, security and development, 
even if China does not have similar capacity, it still has similar determination (⺈ℝ摖
♥₏䱜⏷槱䤓㔏㦾◖儶ᇬ⸘⏷✛♠⻤䤓拢恾᧨₼⦌☂≎㼰㦘伊⇋䤓厌┪᧨⃮㦘伊
⇋䤓⑂㉒ duiyu caiqu yizhong quanmian de jishu shengjiᇬanquan he fazhan de daolu, 
Zhongguo jibian meiyou leisi de nengli, yeyou leisi de juexin) (Beeson, 2010:76). 
 
In accordance with formal differences in governments’ expenditure, economic intervention 
methods, and market coordinating approaches, Thomas Kalinowski (2014) believes that China 
today is similar to Japan before the 1980s and South Korea before the 1990s, featuring 
protectionism and clear macroeconomic plans. 
 
 
Table 1: Types of Capitalism 
Source: Kalinowski (2014) 
 
The second view is championed by Trubek (2010) of University of Wisconsin-Madison and 
Evans (2013, 2014), a key figure in the developmental state theory. Trubek asserts that it is more 
appropriate to use the NDS theory to describe the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). 
Based on the different degrees of state intervention and economic openness, Trubek classifies 
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developmental states into three types. The first refers to Classical Developmental States - like 
Germany - characterized by strong national intervention, weak economic openness, and evident 
protectionism. The second is Asian Developmental States, featuring strong national intervention 
and relative economic openness, while restricting foreign direct investment. The third is NDS, 
represented by the BRIC countries, which have strong government intervention, but are more open 
in economy than the former two. Trubek highlights the lapsing of an epoch, when it was possible 
for backward countries to collectively kick start short-term industrialization and catch up with or 
surpass developed countries, because of global supply chains, information technology 
development, and the rise of the knowledge-based economy. It is important for NDSs to go beyond 
the East Asian experience and establish a new political economics of developmental states for 
themselves4.  
 
Although both scholars use the concept of the NDS, Evans aligns with embeddedness and 
focuses more attention on the amendment of the targets of the developmental state and on the 
adjustment of relations between the state, society, and enterprises (Evans, 2013, 2014). In the 
opinion of Evans, the developmental state theory must surpass the singular economic development 
target and instead emphasize expanding human capacity, a Senian approach at its core, i.e., human 
development is not only the ultimate target for development, but also a crucial measure for raising 
productivity (Evans, 2013). Evans stresses embeddedness, especially the impact of such factors as 
state competence, state-society ties, national strength, and civil society on achieving 
developmental state targets and human development targets. In his opinion, the most crucial factor 
is the competent, continuous, and stable public service agencies, without which it is difficult to 
reach the targets of human development and human capacity expansion. He emphasizes that large 
developing countries like China and India are certainly different from traditional East Asian 

4  Trubek summarizes the core political assertions of the New Developmental State political 
economy: to achieve the specific niche and strengthen technological and innovative capacities 
through planned investment with special purpose, enhance its position in the global supply chain, 
have a major reliance on private investment instead of government investment, prefer to strengthen 
entrepreneurship and product innovation rather than relying on imported technology, promote 
productive rather than speculative FDI, intensify competition not protection among private 
businesses, leverage the capital market in allocating resources, and decrease inequality to 
guarantee social stability, etc. (D. Trubek, 2010). 
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developmental states. They have more complex national structures, more sophisticated state-
society ties, and interactive modes. They both confront a similar issue while rapidly developing: 
the political strength of the increasingly strong capital which is likely to destroy state competence 
and prevent them from reaching their developmental state targets if there is no strong 
countervailing social force.  
 
Structural Dynamism and the Diversity of Developmental States 
For the above-mentioned points, we can find many counter-factual as rebuttals or to verify our 
points further. For instance, John B. Knight overly emphasizes commonalities among 
developmental states, while overlooking their differences. East Asian developmental countries 
have experienced problems including with interest groups, social stability issues, and financial 
risks, all of which are certainly present in China, but the root causes still differ. Even for those East 
Asian developmental states, the reasons and representations of those problems are not entirely 
alike. It is also questionable for Thomas Kalinowski to believe that trade protectionism is the 
similar trait between China and the early stages of Japan and South Korea. It is more plausible that 
they lacked protectionism and foreign investments, with an over-reliance on external markets 
(Huang, 2008; Jia, 2015). Even if Chinese development is one of protectionism, its focus and 
formation mechanism also differs from that of the early stages of Japanese and South Korean 
protectionism. Japanese-South Korean protectionism was possible because of the US’ tolerance of 
neo-mercantilism in the Cold War context, allowing Japan and South Korea to benefit from 
leveraging the fast-expanding international economy to enter key European and North American 
markets relatively freely, without having to open up domestic markets.  
 
This paper aims to address Chinese conditions from the lens of Western academia’s 
developmental state theory. It does not attempt to provide a comprehensive evaluation. As a 
historically specific and non-universal theoretical framework, the images under the lens of the 
developmental state can be innumerable. In our opinion, the most valuable question is whether a 
common success mechanism among a plethora of developmental states exists. We do not believe 
the answer lies in baskets of policy recommendations, for from a cause-effect view, policies from 
all successful developmental states are formulated, implemented, and effected under specific 
external environments and in differing internal conditions. Without temporal-specific conditions, 
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these policies may not be transferable to different subjects. However, the continuous and repeated 
successes of the developmental state model in the world over an extended period of time indicates 
the potential for success for state-led economic development, and more crucially it demonstrates 
the existence of a certain kind of specific cause-effect mechanism. We will benefit from these 
diverse forms of developmental state theory if we explore such a cause and effect mechanism.  
From Johnson to Evans, none of the theoretical founders of the developmental state theory 
has given a convincing answer to this question. For them, success may be traced back to competent 
government agencies and carefully orchestrated industrial polices (Chalmer, 1982), or from the 
state’s competence in embedding the economy (Evans, 1995), or from effective bureaucratic 
systems and embedding the economy (Kasahara, 2013). It is easy to understand that their 
differences are more likely a result of case studies; therefore, their conclusions are characteristic 
of a specific case study, without attaining a generic answer appropriate for guidance. Inheriting 
traditions from Liszt and J. A. Joseph Alois Schumpeter, and researching the development 
experience of Germany and the East Asian countries, Reinert and Zhang Xia draw the conclusion 
that choosing a correct industrial activity (of increasing returns) is a good path for economic 
empowerment and state growth. Scholars have conducted extensive discussions on how to choose 
and promote these correct industrial activities, based on the third technology revolution and new 
features of global trade and the division of work (Jia, 2015; Reinert, 2010). Still, we have to ask if 
selecting correct industrial activities is a method by itself, or already part of the target. If we admit 
that the formation and operation of the developmental state are two different processes, then the 
choice of correct industrial activities is just a path to building a wealthy and strong country, instead 
of the wealthy and strong country itself. How then can we reach the aim, even if we choose the 
correct direction?   
 
The developmental state does not just mean that government intervention must happen; 
otherwise all countries of the world are developmental states. Likewise, the developmental state 
does not mean that the government must support or guide a specialized department because it is a 
common policy characteristic that echoes from the past to the present for all countries5. Historically, 

5 For example, Block F believes USA is a hidden developmental state, and its power can be found 
in supporting national innovation system and effective intervening in new technological sectors 
and strategic industries. This power has been growing in the past three decades, which can be seen 
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the developmental state only refers to those countries where the state plays a role as the social 
engine in the process of restructuring national economic systems. Tracing from the developmental 
state back to Liszt, it only refers to a country which accelerates and drives the transfer of a primary, 
primitive, and agricultural economic system into a modern manufacturing-based industrial system 
(Kasahara, 2013). According Woo-Cumings (1999), the developmental state model can be used to 
describe the mercantilism period of modern Europe, and later the rising periods of Germany and 
the USA. Shaun Breslin believes that the developmental state described by Liszt indicates a 
continuity between the China Model and early Asian developmentalism model and even earlier 
European and American state-dominated development systems exists (Breslin, 2011). 
 
Therefore, a more comprehensive and dynamic perspective should consider the development 
process of the developmental state as the formation process of the modern market economy country 
dominated by the government, not from the perspective of a special policy package. Although 
government dominance is a shared characteristic for developmental states, it is just a starting point, 
not the destination. According to Jessup, a representative of the Regulation School, the formation 
of an effective development model is the result of the coordination and cooperation between 
market mechanism, state intervention, and social structure as a driving mechanism for 
structuralizing, rather than originating purely from the state. So, the story of East Asian countries 
is the story that those countries achieve state-economy-society structural correspondence in their 
rapid industrialization process in the Cold War period (Jessop and Cho, 2001; He, 2011). From this 
point of view, we can discuss the essence of the developmental state. A developmental state is a 
country without an effective market mechanism and state management at the very beginning, one 
that lacks mature social structures or mature market subjects or civil societies. Under a collective 
desire for economic development, government mobilizes, organizes, inspires, and leads societal 
and economic entities, and eventually drives a spontaneous and internally driven market economy 
in the right industrial direction. It may be authoritarian or liberal, but its final goal is to form an 
economy which is dominated by internal economic incentives and possesses internal driving forces. 
The government is extremely important to the developmental state because it is the sole possible 

from NASA and Advanced Projects Research Agency (ARPA). The same happens to Europe. See 
(Block F, 2008). 
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and legal mobilizer and organizer at the very beginning. Embeddedness is crucial to the 
developmental state because the government can only guide economic and social entities to realize 
economic and social goals, not replace them. Instead, it must maintain a distance with the market 
and society, but still maintain a reasonable direction6. It must find a delicate balance between 
permeating and extruding, and between inspiring and restraining. The developmental state has to 
change from the idea that “the country should complete social and economic targets in a planned 
and reasonable way” into the idea that “internally driven market subjects and civil society should 
complete social and economic targets”. In this change process, the difference between internal and 
external initial conditions and the gap in subjective initiatives would lead to different 
characteristics of development paths. This is the real reason for the diversity of developmental 
states.  
 
If we observe the developmental state from the perspective of structural dynamism, we can 
explain development and understand “why this type of development, not that type”. Any 
developmental state is confronted with specific internal and external constraints7. The internal 
constraints include resource endowments, social structures and corresponding political patterns, 
initial market development (like the initial distribution of market entities, ownership systems, 
scales, etc.), and bureaucratic capacity, etc. The external constraints include external economic 
conditions (the stages of technological long waves, international division of labor, and trade order), 
and external political and military conditions (alliances and opposing forces). Objectively, internal 
and external constraints provide the whole possibility set for state actions. In the development 
process of the developmental state, those conditions will change accordingly. For instance, the 

6 The defects of the developmental state mainly come from embedding difficulties. According to 
Mark Beeson, the risks and skills of the developmental state are that its bureaucracies should be 
strong enough and good at coordinating and approaching society and economic operators. Only in 
this way can policies be implemented and development “guided”. If the bureaucracies keep too 
close a relation with special interest groups, they will become the “captives” or servants of the 
latter. This is the reason for “crony capitalism”. 
7 Some scholar believes that the change of social structures is the basic factor to determine 
political systems, mechanisms, and the choice and implementation of development strategies of 
the industrialization era (Fang Ning 2015), but in our opinion, it is just one of the internal 
constraints. 
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growth of the developmental state leads to changes in domestic social, political, and economic 
situations, or external political, economic, and military conditions. The policies of the 
developmental state have to adapt to such changes, so that developmental goals may be reached 
with success. The differences of the initial constraints are manifested in different path-dependency. 
Dynamic changes to environmental factors would create different paths for developmental states. 
Historically, successful developmental states have set their successful development directions 
based on their initial constraints, and then adjust along with the changes of those constraints.  
 
What Kind of “Development” State is China? 
The development process of East Asian developmental states fully demonstrates the structural 
dynamic evolutionary process of modern market economic countries dominated by the government. 
The reason for their developmental similarities and dissimilarities can be found in their internal 
and external restraining conditions and dynamic changes. Judging from the developmental paths 
of the first-tier Asian Newly Industrialized Economics (Japan, South Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan), the similarities of their initial external conditions go as follows: in political and military 
conditions, they all belonged to the Western group in the Cold War and shared the same ideology 
and political system as the UK and the USA. Therefore, they could benefit from external economic 
aid to different degrees, realize the first wave of capital accumulation, and establish their industrial 
systems accordingly8. They were all allowed tacitly to deploy protectionism through various kinds 
of subsidies and apply strict controls over foreign capital, in the process of building up and 
supporting targeted sectors 9 . When European countries allow those countries to take the 
protectionism measures mentioned above, they open their markets to those countries not in a 
coordinated way and take loose policies towards technology transfer and intellectual property 

8 The relevant statistics show Japan received orders up to USD 3.4 billion during the Korean War. 
Johansson regarded American aid to Japan as an Asian Marshall Plan. Taiwan and South Korea 
had the similar advantageous external conditions during the Vietnam War. In 1946-1978, South 
Korea obtained economic aid and loans up to USD 6 billion.   
9 Singapore is the sole exception. Singapore, independent since 1965, did not enjoy benefits from 
the Korean War, and had no natural resources for sale. Its only advantageous condition is its ports. 
It is extremely capital thirsty in terms of capital accumulation and industry initiation. This resulted 
in Singapore showing extreme tolerance, welcoming and even stimulating policies for foreign 
capital represented by multinational corporates in its initial development (Kasahara, 2013). 
Yang Hutao   JCIR: VOL. 6, No. 1 (2018) 
108 
rights. In external technological conditions, the first-tier Asian Newly Industrialized Economies 
all went through the mature stage of the fourth technological tide, as well as the fifth technological 
tide. In their process of economic development, the global value chain has not taken shape. The 
division of labor between products was the main form of the international division of labor. 
Multinational corporations had not reached the monopoly levels of power they enjoy today. This 
significantly eased the way for these countries to catch up with technologies and create unique 
technological niches. 
 
As far as internal similarities are concerned, the countries and regions mentioned above 
possess three common advantages: it is easy for them to reach a consensus in surpassing the 
developed countries economically, and they possess excellent bureaucratic classes, as well as a 
large quantity of easily activated potential market entities. Firstly, the beginning of their economic 
development also saw the emergence of the Cold War environment. Due to historical reasons, those 
countries and regions were confronted with strong external pressure, and therefore a spirit of 
nationalism was necessary and easy to come by. Achieving rapid economic development as a goal 
is a necessary measure to strengthen the legality of a government’s performance, and the cost of 
social cohesion and mobilization is lower. Hence, it was possible to make economic development 
the primary target. Secondly, the bureaucratic classes shared a strong consensus in their inclination 
towards a free market. Those countries had many technocrats with relevant knowledge and 
experience, which makes them possible competent drivers of the developmental state. Thirdly, in 
the early period when the first-tier Asian Newly Industrialized Economies became developmental 
states, they all went through enormous social structural changes through war or reform, the fixed 
boundary between social classes and interest groups loosened, and society tended to be “flattened”, 
which made it possible to  
 
Adopt a directional and constraining special political system and development strategy 
to direct social flow to the economic field in the industrialization process. The wide 
and strong powers for economic growth took form and political participation and 
political dispute were limited (Fang Ning, 2015).10  

10Fang Ning calls those countries having gone through the changes of social structures the “rapid 
countries” of Asia, and those without having gone through the changes of social structures “slow 
countries”, the Philippines being one of the latter. Measures to stimulate the economy made by the 
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Briefly speaking, those countries possessed many potential market entities with lower activated 
cost.  
 
We will not discuss the dissimilarities existing between these developmental states due to 
the limited length of the paper. It should be noted that comprehending the theory and making a 
case study should all start with special historical contexts. Without understanding the pre-World 
War II Japanese economy, it would be impossible to appreciate the technological and talent 
foundations for the post-World War II Japanese miracle. Without the context of Singapore’s 
independence, it would be impossible to analyze the formation of its internationalism-oriented 
system. Without full recognition of Chinese uniqueness in internal and external constraints after 
China confirmed its prioritization of economic development, without appreciating the continuity 
of Chinese socio-economic development in the first and second thirty years period, it would be 
impossible to grasp the specialness of China from the perspective of the developmental state. In 
summary, the internal and external constraints confronting China and the changes originating from 
changes of those conditions all differ from those of other developmental states, except the 
consistency of the legality of economic development targets and in collective will. This indicates 
that the developmental state path China took has been a unique one since the very beginning.   
 
From the view of initial external political and military conditions, China did have the kind 
of opportunities that Japan and South Korea had. It is also impractical to adopt the same model as 
what these two countries did. Frankly, China has always been confronted with distrust, vigilance, 
repression, and precaution since the very beginning of its development. With long-term changes 
in the international order, the effects of China’s rise would certainly overshadow that of Japan, 
South Korea, and other regions, because “the new developmental state like China has the ability 
to become a competitor and challenger of international orders” (Trubek, 2008). From the view of 
external economic conditions, China has been facing a severe technology lockdown and the 
limitation of intellectual property rights from technologically developed countries since the very 
beginning. When China became more fully embedded in the global labor division system and trade 
system, symbolized by its entry into the membership of the World Trade Organization, the global 

former are easier to be implemented than those in the latter. 
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value chain had mostly been formed. Under the context of modular manufacturing and intra-
production labor division, Chinese technological advancement is limited in strength and nature, 
which sets itself apart from any other developmental state. Also, China cannot develop under the 
U.S. dollar-based system as did Japan and South Korea. China’s impact on the staple commodities 
like energies and China’s economic development’s impact on the world labor force’s markets and 
labor division order are enormous and profound. As Shawn Breslin puts it, China’s integration into 
the world economy will unavoidably bring about great losses of jobs for many other countries and 
the resetting of their development strategies due to its cheaper production platforms. The Asian-
Pacific political and economic situations will be redefined because of this (Breslin, 2005). 
 
For initial internal conditions, China differs significantly from other developmental states in 
social and economic structures, and economic bureaucratic classes. They only share the premise 
of being “easy to reach the consensus of surpassing developed economies”. The source of this 
difference comes from the planned economic foundation that China had. The evolutionary process 
of China’s market economy is also a transformation process for its planned economy. While 
countries like Japan and South Korea embraced liberal markets without hesitation, China has 
always consistently insisted on its exploration of a socialist path with Chinese characteristics. 
China has been cautious about the intense and rapid reform of political and economic structures, 
which sets it apart from Eastern European countries. When China clarified economic development 
as its preferred goal, the preferences and competences of economic bureaucrats formed in the 
planned economy era, as well as the economic entities and social structures formed in the same 
era, became key in comprehending the initial internal constraints. 
As far as economic bureaucrats are concerned, Japan and South Korea had a plethora of 
technocrats with extensive knowledge, rich experience, and a strong consensus to develop free 
markets. Comparatively, China had a batch of bureaucratic strata with consistent political ideology, 
loyalty, and rich experience in planned economy management. Japan and South Korea are likely 
to ensure continuity due to common preferences and, because of the separation of powers, their 
policy implementation can be easily misaligned and counteract one another. The difference on the 
level of government management means that, at least, China does not suffer from the same issues. 
As Shaun Breslin stated, when devising policies, the Chinese government often sacrifices 
rationality, harmoniousness, and uniformity, out of concern over maintaining party unity and 
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avoiding opposition from local government. The development policies from the Central 
Government are often distorted or boycotted when implemented on a local level, making the 
effective national implementation of economic coordination an arduous task (Breslin, 1996). 
 
When inspecting economic entities, the enormous state-owned economy from the planned 
economy era is undoubtedly the major economic entity, but it is not an absolute market economy 
entity. Between the state and urban residents, between state-owned enterprise managers and 
employees, implicit contracts such as lifetime employment and other welfare promises always 
existed. It is not an easy task to activate and modify them towards marketization. Comparatively, 
potential and easily activated economic entities lie in rural collective and private enterprises. 
Market economy entities and external supports are lacking, and state-owned economy takes charge. 
Under such a premise, Chinese development chose peripheral reform outside of the established 
system and this released vitality from economic entities with least resistance. The differences in 
the structure of economic entities have persisted for more than thirty years of development. This 
well explains why the reform of state-owned enterprises has been an important issue for China’s 
economic and social development.   
 
The wide differences in initial external and internal conditions mean that China’s so-called 
“developmental state” has differed from other East Asian developmental states from the very 
beginning. Although some researchers believe that there is no such thing as “China miracle” from 
the perspective of economic development (Wang, 2011), they fail to answer the question “Why 
does it develop like this?” In terms of economic policies and performances, we can find the “East 
Asian Phenomenon” that corresponds to “China Phenomenon”, but their similarities in 
phenomenon do not indicate an identical cause-effect mechanism. Rather,  
 
The repetition of comparative studies does not just exist at the phenomenon level, and 
observation and comparison of the repetition are not conducted at the phenomenon level 
either (Fang, 2015).  
 
Historically, strategic imitation and policy imitation ignoring differences always fails to 
achieve expected results. In this respect, the international economic circulation strategy in 1990s 
is typically representative. This strategy abandons the past economic development strategy 
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dependent on the internal division of labor and domestic demands11, and turns to external markets 
and foreign capital for support. Japan, South Korea, and other countries used similar strategies. 
China is different from Japan and South Korea, in that China has a potential big market ranging 
from producer goods to consumer goods. Japan and South Korea used an export-oriented 
development strategy after a complete deepening of their internal division of labor. This export-
oriented development strategy is a way to set free production capability, achieve capital 
accumulation through external demands, and obtain an opportunity to create a technological niche. 
China’s export-oriented strategy started before its internal division of labor was sufficiently 
deepened and domestic demand market fully expanded. In the context of module-based production 
and divided global value chains, China was unable to imitate Japan and South Korea, which 
actively developed export-oriented economies and exported to developed countries. Instead, China 
had to reverse that path, accepting Western developed countries deploying market protection for 
domestic high-end products while opening China’s own high-end product market for Western 
exports. It also had to accept an assembling-based economy and enclave economy in the context 
of the export-oriented economy and bear the infamy of “Chinese style deception”12. Therefore, the 
international economic circulation strategy fails to reach the expected result. On the contrary, it 
led to the siphoning of the capital and resources of the labor force to coastal export-oriented sectors, 
producing a misshapen “dual economy” which separated export and domestic demands, curbed 
domestic demands, and led to serious economic bubbles (Jia, 2010).   
The differences in initial external and internal conditions make China a special 
“developmental state” and make us cautious about the experiences and failures of East Asian 

11 According to the statistics and analysis made by Huang Yasheng, China’s rural economy and 
domestic demand-oriented economic reform had made enormous progress in economic growth, 
income distribution, and employment before it turned to foreign demand and foreign investment. 
Economic growth is driven by consumption and family-based consumption, accounting for half of 
the GDP. In his opinion, China’s economic rise starting from the late 1970s is attributable to 
domestic rural economic development and internal reform and limited external reform. 
12 This term came from the trade war between China and the US for textiles of 30132003. 
According to a New York Times report, China did not obey the relevant rules after its entrance into 
the WTO and partook in a so called Chinese style deception. Please refer to David Barboza, 
‘Textile industry seeks trade limits on Chinese’, New York Times, 25 July 2003. 
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developmental states. From the perspective of market economic growth and national 
modernization level, those successes and failures are worth learning from. In fact, there is much 
to be learned from all developmental states and successful market economic states on how they 
achieved a dynamic balance between state, society, and economy. Usually, a country does not have 
mature market mechanisms, market entities, or a mature civil society in the infancy of its market 
economy. Its first task is to foster and guide market mechanisms, and help market subjects and 
civil society to grow. What measures should be made depend on its internal and external 
constraints. With gradual development of market mechanisms, market entities, and civil society, 
how a state dominates markets, manages its society, and achieves effective embeddedness 
becomes more important. Despite over 30 years of reform and opening, China has yet to establish 
an effective mechanism harmoniously integrating market mechanisms, government intervention, 
and social structures. It is certainly important to summarize and compare China’s various fields 
and aspects of Chinese economic development, but the essential radical issue still goes back to the 
issue of a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics. More efforts should be made in 
research on how a self-driven market economic system takes form.  
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